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ABSTRACT 
CULTURAL INFLUENCES IN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: 
CONSERVATISM AND VERTICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
 
by Cyrus Sarrafpour 
 
    After an extensive literature review on authoritarianism and right-wing ideology, 
Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, and Sulloway (2003) developed  a model of conservatism as 
motivated social cognition.  The model asserts that feelings of uncertainty, fear, and 
threat stimulate existential, epistemic, and ideological social-cognitive motives, which in 
turn lead to political conservatism in the forms of resistance to change and endorsement 
of inequality.  The model, however, generally bypassed the notion that situational factors, 
such as cultural values, might also be influential in the manifestation and shaping of 
conservative ideologies.  This study included situational factors such as the role of a 
hierarchical cultural dimension (Vertical Individualism) on conservative beliefs in the 
forms of resistance to change and endorsement of inequality.  A battery of surveys was 
administered to assess the relationship between culture and conservatism. The surveys 
were administered to an American university sample (N=157, 56 males and 101 
females) as well as to general population samples from the USA (N=299, 140 males and 
159 females) and Sweden (N=164, 73 males and 91 females) for cross-cultural 
comparisons. Results indicated that Vertical Individualism (VI) is indeed associated with 
conservatism and that this association holds cross-culturally.  A multiple regression 
analysis demonstrated that VI is an appropriate addition to Jost et al.’s (2003) model of 
conservatism with respect to endorsement of inequality, but not for resistance to change. 
Theoretical and applied results and implications are discussed. 
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Introduction
 Psychologists have been investigating the different psychological tendencies and 
motives that underlie the political right and left for over half a century.  Singling out and 
studying conservatism as one type of sociopolitical ideology first began with a landmark 
study of fascist-like personality and authoritarianism by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, and Sanford (1950).  Since then, the study of right-wing ideology has 
predominantly involved examining individual differences with respect to specific 
ideological beliefs (e.g., resistance to change, dogmatism, and Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism).   
  More recently, a relatively comprehensive model of conservatism, proposed by 
Jost, Glaser, Krusglanski, and Sulloway (2003), went further than just focusing on 
individual differences.  The authors suggested that focusing solely on personality 
differences is a mistake because people adopt “conservative ideologies in an effort to 
satisfy various social-cognitive motives” (p. 339).  Consequently, after reviewing the 
voluminous literature and comparing differences between cognitive styles and 
motivational needs across political ideologies, Jost et al. developed an integrative model 
of political conservatism as motivated social cognition.  In their model (Figure 1), 
environmental stimuli such as feelings of fear, threat, and uncertainty contribute to social 
cognitive motives, resulting in political conservatism in the forms of resistance to change 
and endorsement of inequality.  The social-cognitive motives in the model involve three 
domains.  The first includes epistemic motives, including dogmatism, intolerance of 
ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for order, structure, and closure, whereby beliefs 
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and information are reached through a process of motivated search for knowledge to 
make sense of the world.  The second domain comprises of existential motives, such as 
self-esteem, loss prevention, and terror management, in which people develop to cope 
with existing crises that are inherent in the human experience.  Third are ideological 
motives, including rationalization of self-interest, group-based dominance, and system 
justification, where sociopolitical theories are used to focus on the societal system as a 
whole as well as the psychological and ideological functions that a conservative 
orientation might fulfill.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Social-Cognitive Motives of Conservatism.   
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 Although the model proposed by Jost et al. (2003) is sophisticated and relatively 
comprehensive, their model neglected cultural aspects of political ideology, and the 
influence of cultural values and societal norms was not given as much weight as potential 
ideological social-cognitive motives (e.g., cultural acceptance of group-based 
dominance.)  Cultural values with respect to political ideology can be investigated by 
examining aspects of social structures favored by a collective, such as the endorsement or 
opposition of a social hierarchy in terms of wealth, social class, status or power.  These 
types of attributes of societal hierarchy, and consequent power differentiations, can be 
perceived as being more or less acceptable based on corresponding cultural values.  The 
realization of the general approval or disapproval of such hierarchical power-
differentiations can lead to the development of a deeper and better understanding of right-
wing political movements, such as approval for fascist-like legislature, public support for 
the restriction of individual freedom by authorities, or public support of withholding 
government assistance to those in need (e.g., universal healthcare, welfare programs, 
economic safety-nets), as will be discussed in upcoming chapters.    
  The present study investigated the relationship between cultural values of how a 
society should be structured (e.g., social hierarchy or social equality), and political 
ideology.  I assessed the relationship between ideological conservative components and 
acceptance of social hierarchies, and propose the inclusion of Vertical Individualism, a 
type of cultural value, into Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism as part of 
ideological social-cognitive motives. 
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 Cultural Dimensions 
  The most studied cultural dimensions in psychology are collectivism and 
individualism (Brewer & Chen, 2007).  These cultural dimensions pertain to a person’s 
subjective perception of his or her relationship with the entire collective, as well as with 
the other individuals in that respective collective (Brewer & Chen).  In cultures that tend 
to be more collectivistic, individuals have a self-perception of being co-dependent with 
others in their environment, and socio-cultural beliefs and collective interests are of high 
personal value as they are considered to be more important than the individual’s interest.  
In contrast, people in cultures that are more individualistic tend to view themselves as 
being autonomous from others, hence they have a higher regard for individual 
achievement and personal freedom with rights separate from, and at times above, the one 
of the collective.  
  However, due to the constructs of individualism and collectivism being widely 
criticized for their ambiguous definitions and lack of conceptual clarity (Tsui et al., 2007), 
researchers have dissected these constructs further into vertical and horizontal dimensions 
(Triandis, 1995).  The vertical dimension of a culture reflects beliefs that view the self 
differently from other selves in a collective, and thus involve an accepting attitude of a 
social hierarchy or order based on social status and class. In contrast, a horizontal 
dimension corresponds to a belief and value system of equality between individuals in a 
collective, where individuals in a society are and should be of equal value.  The 
horizontal dimension has less of an acceptance and support for a society comprised of 
social class and hierarchy.  Taken together, four distinct dimensions of culture can be 
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identified: Horizontal Individualism (HI), Vertical Individualism (VI), Horizontal 
Collectivism (HC), and Vertical Collectivism (VC). 
  Triandis and Gelfand (1998) summarized and discussed the theoretical and 
empirical support for the components of each of these dimensions.  They stated that 
people high on the HI dimension want to be distinct and unique from other groups and 
fellow group members.  HI people are very self-reliant, trend towards doing things their 
own way, and are likely to say “I want to do my own thing,” but do not have a particular 
interest in attaining high-status or becoming distinguished by the group.  In contrast, 
people high on the VI dimension tend to strive for social status and to be able to 
distinguish themselves from the rest of the collective by competing with other individuals 
in the same group.  People high on the HC dimension emphasize mutual objectives with 
others, sociability, and interdependence, but they are reluctant to submit to authority.  
They also see themselves as being similar to others in their respective collective.  For 
people high on VC, the central theme of self-concept revolves around the importance of 
the collective; individuals in this dimension highly value the integrity of their respective 
society.  For instance, they are willing to sacrifice individual personal goals for the 
objective of their society while supporting competition of their respective collective with 
external ones.  Individuals in this dimension tend to comply and submit to demands from 
authority even if what is asked of them is considered “extremely distasteful” (Triandis & 
Gelfand, p. 119).   
  In theory, cultural dimensions are a suitable addition to the social-cognitive 
motives that are composed of a cluster of situational and social values.  Epistemic and 
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existential motivational theories focus on the individual, and perceive the manifestation 
of conservative behavior and attitudes as a result of these cognitive-motivations. In 
contrast, ideological motives focus on sociopolitical systems and how these result in 
ideological functions that conservatism might satisfy.  Hence, cultural values are suitable 
in the ideological sphere of conservatism because they are comprised of socially learned 
values that influence sociopolitical ideologies.  
Conservatism – Definition, Socioeconomic Inequality and Resistance to Change 
  In defining conservatism, Neilson proposed that conservatism is “the disposition 
and tendency to preserve what is established; opposition to change” (Neilson, 1958, p. 
568, cited in Jost et al. 2003).  In a similar vein, Morris claimed that conservatism is the 
“disposition in politics to maintain the existing order” (Morris, 1976, p. 312).  Others 
have defined conservatism as “an attitude of opposition to disruptive change in the social, 
economic, legal, religious, political, or cultural order” (Rossiter, 1968, p. 291, cited in 
Jost et al. 2003).  Consistent with these definitions, research on conservative ideology has 
found that the key component for self-definition of conservatives and liberals concern the 
resistance to, rather than acceptance of, change (Conover & Feldman, 1981). 
  Jost et al. (2003) reviewed a set of changing peripheral, or secondary, 
associations of conservatism.  They summarized that conservatism, as a historical 
ideological belief system, has expressed many things, including “the desire for order and 
stability, preference for gradual rather than revolutionary change (if any), adherence to 
preexisting social norms, idealization of authority figures, punishment of deviants, and 
endorsement of social and economic inequality” (Jost et al., pg. 343).  For instance, after 
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studying the left and right wings of traditional political spectrums, Giddens (1998) stated 
that a major condition that consistently reappears when trying to distinguish the right 
from the left concerns attitudes and beliefs towards equality.  Left-wing societies tend 
towards equality, whereas right-wing societies tend toward hierarchy (p. 40).  
  Research linking resistance to change and endorsement of inequality aligns with 
the tenets of a vertical individualistic cultural dimension.  In the next chapter I discuss 
how a vertical cultural orientation favors a hierarchical societal structure, consequently 
endorsing the status-quo socioeconomic inequality while also expressing reluctance 
towards changing it into a more egalitarian one.  Therefore, a high vertical cultural 
orientation expresses reluctance to changing an already unequal socioeconomic societal 
structure.   
Conservatism and Vertical Individualism 
  In order to understand how culture and ideology affect each other, we can 
examine their related and co-varying components.  For instance, a study conducted by 
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) showed that individuals who score high on 
conservatism, compared to those who score low, tend to be against affirmative action in 
America.  In response to such findings, Zdaniuk and Bobocel (2011) examined beliefs 
concerning the distaste and negative attitudes towards government-run social 
interventions, such as affirmative action, with respect to one’s self-concept and world-
view.  They found that those who expressed negative attitudes and disapproval of 
government programs aimed at assisting the public (e.g.,  Affirmative action) tend to 
score higher on measures of individualism.  Moreover, those scoring high on 
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individualism were shown to endorse principles of micro-justice, which affirmative 
action is violating by assisting a minority (out-group), and oppose principles of macro-
justice, which affirmative action is promoting.  Findings such as these theoretically align 
with the vertical-individualistic cultural dimensions in that individuals have to compete 
with each other; giving a certain group any type of advantage that is not given to the rest 
of the collective as a way for them to rise in the social hierarchy is “cheating” and 
unfavorable. 
  The effects of this pro-hierarchical world-view can further be detected amongst 
studies in political psychology.  For instance, Castelli and Carraro (2010) examined the 
role of cognitive processes with respect to attitude formation amongst a variety of 
political ideologies.  They showed that compared to liberals, conservatives tend to 
characterize physiological attributes to negative stimuli amongst people, such as skin 
color or ethnicity, and also consider themselves to be higher up on a “moral hierarchy.”  
Along the same lines, a study by Shook and Fazio (2009) demonstrated that conservatives 
tend to display significantly more avoidant strategies than liberals while exploring the 
environment, which lead them to stronger learning asymmetries and favoring the learning 
of negative over positive stimuli.  What these types of research have in common is that 
they both not only indicate that negative information automatically grabs the attention of 
more conservative individuals, but also that they form more negative attitudes toward 
social minorities while stereotyping based on negative arbitrary information.  This further 
indicates a tendency of highly conservative individuals to categorize or “classify” people 
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into lower stages of social hierarchy, especially marginalized groups such as immigrants, 
homosexuals, minorities, or other non-traditional social groups. 
  Further indications suggesting that conservatism is associated with a vertical-
individualistic cultural dimension can be seen with respect to beliefs about ideal 
government spending.  For instance Skitka and Tetlock (1993) conducted a study on 
conservative political ideology with respect to public assistance in forms of government 
funding, and showed that highly conservative individuals tend to blame poverty on self-
indulgence, lack of moral standards, and intelligence. Those scoring low on conservatism 
perceive the poor as being victims of unjust social practices and structures.  Skitka & 
Tetlock’s study also showed that low scoring conservatives tend to have attitudes that 
favor applicants of public assistance programs.  However, those scoring high on 
conservatism are more motivated to withhold assistance from those who are believed to 
have created their own need for assistance, and more concerned about preventing “free-
riders” from taking advantage of the system. 
   In general, individuals with less conservative ideologies (e.g., left-wing liberals) 
favor increased spending on social programs that assist the poor or those in need, whereas 
conservatives tend to favor the opposite (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993).  This aligns with the 
vertical cultural orientation in that high-scoring conservatives are in favor of an unequal 
socioeconomic status-quo and more reluctant to changing it, hence being more or less 
supportive of a societal hierarchy.  Low-scoring conservatives, however, have more 
egalitarian attitudes towards wealth distribution. 
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 Cross-cultural research in political psychology has also shown that horizontal and 
vertical dimensions of culture co-vary with respect to milieu, culture, and culture-induced 
beliefs about “ideal societies.”  For instance, Fiske (1992) and Rokeach (1973) examined 
characteristics pertaining to VI, CI, HC, and HC across nations and cultures, and found 
patterns of cultural and political attributes pertaining to the concept of the self and world-
view associated with the corresponding dominant cultural dimension.  A sample of their 
findings can be seen in Table 1 (adapted from Triandis, 1996). 
 
Table 1. 
     Relation of Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism to Other 
Typologies 
      
Dimension 
 
Collectivism 
  
Individualism 
            Vertical Self 
       Fiske (1992) 
 
Self different from others 
 
Self different from others 
  
Communal sharing 
 
Market pricing 
  
Authority ranking 
 
Authority ranking 
 Rokeach (1973)  Low freedom 
 
High freedom 
  
Low equality 
  
Low equality 
  
Communism (e.g., China) 
 
Market democracy (e.g., 
France) 
Horizontal Self 
      Fiske (1992) 
 
Self same as other 
 
Self same as others 
  
Communal sharing 
 
Market pricing 
  
Equality matching 
 
Equality matching 
 Rokeach (1973) Low freedom High freedom 
  
High equality 
 
High equality 
  
Communal living (e.g., kibbutz) Democratic socialism (e.g., 
Sweden) 
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Objective 
  Taking ecological and individual difference factors influencing political 
ideologies into consideration, I hypothesized that an influential feature missing from the 
Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism is the acceptance or dismissal of a hierarchical 
(vertical) based social structure.  Specifically, I expected that a vertical individualistic 
cultural dimension would be a suitable addition to the ideological motives portion of Jost 
et al.’s model.  Discussing the model, Matthews et al. (2009) summarized the ideological 
motives as emphasizing “the extent to which maintenance of a certain social system is 
important for the individual’s sense of security, and [that] they are primarily indexed by 
the constructs of social dominance orientation and system justification” (p. 922).  Along 
the same lines, I am attempting to demonstrate that cultural dimensions in conjunction 
with Social Dominance Orientation and system justification can substantially account for 
the variance in conservatism, as assessed by resistance to change and endorsement of 
inequality. 
  Furthermore, in order to enforce the construct validity of Vertical Individualism 
and investigate if it indeed is culturally-dependent, samples from Sweden and the United 
States were compared.  An economically class-based society should in theory score 
higher on Vertical Individualism (U.S) than a more egalitarian one where income 
inequality is substantially less (Sweden). Higher scores on endorsement of inequality and 
reluctance for changing the unequal status-quo societal system were also predicted.  I 
tested these hypotheses by comparing how a more egalitarian oriented, social-democratic, 
society (Sweden) scored on Vertical Individualism and components of conservatism 
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compared to a more socioeconomically hierarchical one (USA) and how they differ on 
Social Dominance Orientation, System Justification, and reluctance to social change.  
Social Dominance Orientation 
 Social dominance theory takes societal and evolutionary factors into consideration 
as elements of hierarchy promoting social orientations.  This theory suggests that 
societies attempt to reduce group conflict by developing ideological belief systems that 
validate the domination of some social groups over others (Pratto et al., 1994).  This is 
done through the proclamation of several “legitimizing myths.”  The first is “paternalistic 
myths,” which proclaim that certain groups need to be above others in order to take care 
and lead other subordinate groups who might be unable to take care of themselves.  The 
second is “reciprocal myths,” which claim that a relationship between the dominant and 
subordinate groups exists and works in symbiosis with each other, and that these two 
groups complement each other in a society.  Third are the “sacred myths,” which assert 
that the dominant position of certain groups that are high up in the hierarchy, as well as 
subordinate groups that are low in it, is due to the will of God or some other divine power 
(Sidanius, 1993, pp. 207 – 209).  These ideological devices are intrinsically conservative, 
as they assert an ideology that restricts qualitative social change while striving to 
preserve pre-existing hierarchies of wealth, status, and power (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).   
  Social dominance theory emphasizes that beliefs and attitudes concerning social 
dominance are mutually determined by socialization and biology, and that significant 
individual differences among people exist with respect to Social Dominance Orientation 
(Pratto et al.).  Furthermore, SDO is not only associated with seeking to sustain 
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hierarchical order, but it has also been shown that individuals high in the construct wish 
to increase the degree of group dominance and social hierarchy, as it is an appealing 
ideological goal when one belongs to a high-status group (Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999). 
  The instrument used to assess SDO is composed of two subscales encompassing 
the opposition and reluctance to egalitarianism, social equality and desire for group-based 
dominance (Jost & Thompson, 2000).  In reviewing the literature on SDO and 
conventional measures of economic and political conservatism, Jost et al. (2003) found 
that the average correlation between them is about .30.  SDO has also been shown to 
correlate reliably with nationalism, anti-Black racism, sexism, Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism, the belief in a just and fair world, and identification with the 
Republican Party in the United States (Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994).  The 
aforementioned findings suggest that SDO is a valuable and practical measure to assess 
hierarchical based socio-cultural beliefs, and should in theory be associated with vertical-
individualism. 
System Justification 
  Many personality theories pertaining to right-wing ideology assert ego-justifying 
or ego-defensive aspects of conservatism, especially theories of dogmatism, anxiety 
reduction, and authoritarianism.  That is, the need and satisfaction individuals derive 
from forecasting situations, security, and obedience can explain their attraction to right-
wing ideological attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981).  Even though motives 
of ego-justification constitute an important part of the fostering of right-wing ideology, 
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group-justifying and system-justifying motives are also satisfied in a proficient manner 
by conservative ideologies (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  For instance, social dominance theory, 
discussed above, asserts that the manifestations of conservative legitimizing myths are 
attempts of group-justification in order to vindicate the interest and objectives of 
individuals in high-status and dominant groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
  System justification theory concerns the tendency of individual’s motivation  to 
perpetuate inequality and preserve the status quo, while focusing on his or her cognitive 
thought patterns leading to the subscription of such ideological beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 
1994).  A key objective of system justification theory is to understand why and in what 
manner individuals rationalize the present social system, particularly when their 
endorsement of it appears to be in their own disadvantage, and in conflict with motives to 
enhance self-esteem or enhance group standing (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
 The theory is derived from numerous existing theories, such as Marxist, feminist, 
and sociological theories of legitimizing the status quo to justify the acceptance of right 
wing ideologies and practices (Jost, 1995).  Perhaps the most influential theories 
responsible for the drafting of system justification are cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957, cited in Jost et al. 2003) and just world theory (Lerner, 1980, cited in 
Jost et al. 2003), which assert that individuals are motivated to understand existing social 
systems as rational, legitimate, justifiable, inevitable, and a part of the “natural order.” 
  Jost et al. (2003) argue that political conservatism is present across social classes 
because nearly everyone is motivated to justify and explain the status quo to the extent 
that it is perceived as just and fair.  Furthermore, system justification is a good mediator 
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of political conservatism and should be the strongest amongst individuals on the lower 
stages of the hierarchy (e.g., women and members of the working class) as they are 
particularly vulnerable to the system, and hence have the most to rationalize, explain, and 
justify.  Additionally, to minimize dissonance, one would enforce allegiance to the 
system itself, which is a motivational key enforcement of system justification.  Aside 
from being part of Jost et al.’s (2003) ideological model of social-cognitive motives, 
system justification is based on the ideology of social structures and therefore well suited 
to act as mediator between hierarchical and non-hierarchical societies and conservative 
psychological components.   
Hypotheses 
  The prediction of the current study is that the cultural dimension of Vertical 
Individualism is positively correlated with the conservative ideological components, such 
as group-based dominance and system justification, and political conservatism, in forms 
of endorsement of inequality and resistance to change.  Therefore my first hypothesis is 
that Vertical Individualism positively correlates with Social Dominance Orientation 
(group-based dominance), General System Justification, Economic System Justification 
(endorsement of inequality), and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (resistance to change).  
I then progress to demonstrate that Vertical Individualism is not only capable of 
forecasting conservative values, but is also a suitable addition to Jost et al.’s (2003) 
model of ideological motives of conservatism.  This leads to the second hypothesis that 
Vertical Individualism will predict conservatism, in the forms of endorsement of 
inequality and resistance to change, together with the contributions of Social Dominance 
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Orientation and General System Justification.  Study 1 tests these first two hypotheses 
using American college-aged students. 
  Finally, the relationship between culture and ideology was tested cross-culturally 
in order to reinforce its construct validity as well as to illustrate that this association is 
indeed culture-dependent.  Sweden is considered a more egalitarian oriented society (e.g., 
emphasis on the welfare of the community and social democracy) than the U.S., which is 
in theory more hierarchical (e.g., emphasis on individual freedom and free market 
capitalism).  Consequently, my third hypothesis is that scores of conservatism and 
Vertical Individualism should be significantly lower for Swedish participants due to 
Sweden’s egalitarian oriented societal structure, as compared to participant from the 
United States.  Further, the fourth hypothesis was that Vertical Individualism, together 
with conservatism, should be a less important predictor of conservatism for the Swedish 
sample than for the American one. Study 2 tests these hypotheses by comparing 
representative samples of Swedish and American adults on the key variables in this study, 
including Vertical Individualism (VI), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), General- 
(GSJ) and Economic System Justification (ESJ), and measure of resistance to change in 
forms of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). 
Scale Characteristics 
  All scales displayed high levels of reliability across samples aside from the RWA 
scale for the Swedish sample (Table 2).  The Swedish RWA scale was also the only 
instrument not translated, as it already was available in Swedish.  I was unable to find 
satisfactory reliability even after multiple forms of factor and psychometrical analysis.  
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Table 2. 
Scale Characteristics – University (N=157), USA (N=299), Sweden (N=164) 
Sample Scale N items M SD Cronbach’s α 
University (N =157)      
General System Justification       8    3.66       .87           .71 
   Economic System Justification 17 4.65   .87 .76 
  Social Dominance Orientation 16 2.77   .90 .90 
     Vertical Individualism       4 4.31 1.23 .82 
     Authoritarianism 12 5.08   .96 .76 
     Conservatism 12 4.44 1.15 .86 
     Traditionalism 12 4.02 1.26 .84 
USA (N = 299)      
General System Justification       8 4.08 1.01 .76 
    Economic System Justification 17 4.67 1.05 .79 
   Social Dominance Orientation 16 2.84 1.04 .88 
     Vertical Individualism       4 4.02 1.09 .67 
     Right-Wing Authoritarianism 15 3.85 1.00 .82 
Sweden (N = 164)      
General System Justification       8 3.69 1.00 .80 
    Economic System Justification 17 4.11 1.55 .83 
     Social Dominance Orientation 16 2.44 1.07 .92 
     Vertical Individualism       4 3.44 1.13 .70 
  Right-Wing Authoritarianism 15 4.10 1.07 .27 
 
Study 1 
Participants 
For the first study, 157 participants (56 male and 101 female, MAge = 23.4) were 
recruited through an introductory university psychology course and received course credit 
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for their participation.  Ethnicity and education levels for the sample can be seen in 
Appendix A. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were asked to complete four different scales in the form of surveys 
and a brief demographic questionnaire.  The four scales encompass attitudes and beliefs 
pertaining to the acceptance of societal inequality, resistance to societal change, system 
justification, and a measure assessing cultural dimensions (horizontal and vertical-
individualism and collectivism).  All surveys were administered online.   
  Group based dominance.  The Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO), a 
widely used scale developed by Pratto et al. (1994), aims at measuring the preference for 
inequality among social groups.  It has been shown that individuals who score high on 
SDO are more likely to pursue and support hierarchy-enhancing professional roles, 
whereas those that score low on the SDO scale seek hierarchy reducing professional roles.  
Moreover, the measure has been linked to political and social ideologies that are in favor 
of societal hierarchy.  The SDO scale consists of 16 items, measured on a 1 to 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = extremely negative and 7 = extremely positive), asking respondents how 
they feel about certain questions, such as “we should strive to make incomes as equal as 
possible” or “group equality should be our ideal.”  
  System Justification.  A System Justification scale, developed by Zimmerman et 
al. (2013), was used to assess attitudes and beliefs about the righteousness of one’s 
current societal structure.  The scale consists of 8 items measured on a 7-point Likert type 
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scale, and includes items such as “In general, you find society is fair” and “Everyone 
does have a fair shot at wealth and happiness.” 
  Resistance to Change.  Much research, particularly in political psychology, has 
used Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) to measure right wing and conservative 
ideologies.  RWA encompasses the covariation of traits, including authoritarian 
aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981).  However, 
the RWA scale measures these traits as a combination of social values and attitudes in a 
unidimensional fashion.  In order to create a scale that measures these traits separately of 
each other while maintaining strong statistical reliability, Duckitt et al. (2010) developed 
the Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Scale (ACT), which re-conceptualizes 
Altemeyer’s RWA Scale into factorial distinct dimensions.  The ACT Scale consists of 
36 items across three scales based on Altemeyer’s RWA Scale, but rephrased as 
Authoritarianism (instead of authoritarian aggression), Conservatism (for authoritarian 
submission), and Traditionalism (conventionalism).  The items are scored on a Likert 
type scale ranging from –4 to +4, and reflects one’s agreement or disagreement with 
statements such as: “Strong, tough government will harm not help our country” 
(authoritarianism), “It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy 
authority” (conservatism), and “The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” 
still show the best way to live” (traditionalism).  
   Both the RWA and the ACT scale were used, but in different studies; the ACT 
scale was used for the university sample, whereas the participants from the Qualtrics 
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panel (the US and the Swedish samples) were administered a shorter, 15-item version, of 
the RWA scale (Zakrisson, 2005). 
  Cultural Dimensions.  Cultural assessment was made using Triandis and 
Gelfand’s (1998) Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale.  The 
scale consists of four items for each dimension, resulting in a total of 16 items, measured 
on a 7-point Likert type scale.  Items include “I’d rather depend on myself than others” 
(horizontal individualism), “it is important that I do my job better than others” (vertical- 
individualism), “if a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud” (horizontal collectivism), 
and “parents and children must stay together as much as possible (vertical collectivism). 
  Acceptance of Inequality.  To measure ideological based tendencies of the 
endorsement and legitimization of economic inequality, the Economic System 
Justification scale was used (Jost & Thompson, 2000).  The scale consists of 17 items 
measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 9, comprised of items such as “poor people are not 
essentially different than rich people” (reversely scored) or “economic positions are 
legitimate reflections of people’s achievements.”  
Results 
 
  I hypothesized that ideological conservative factors, stressing acceptance of 
inequality and resistance to societal change, are systematically related to a cultural 
dimension embracing hierarchical tenets.  I used a University sample (N = 157) to test 
this prediction by exploring how components of conservatism, measured by General (M = 
3.66, SD = .87) and Economic (M = 4.65, SD = .87) System Justification and Social 
Dominance Orientation (M = 2.77, SD = .90) relate to a hierarchy oriented individualistic 
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cultural dimension, measured by a Vertical Individualism scale (M = 4.31, SD = 1.23).   
   Among the University sample, Vertical Individualism was significantly 
correlated with General System Justification (r = .286, p < .001), Economic System 
Justification (r = .333, p < .001), and Social Dominance Orientation (r = .344, p < .001), 
but not with the Authoritarianism-Traditionalism-Conservatism scales (all p values are 
two-tailed.)  Hence the cultural dimension was positively correlated with the ideological 
components of conservatism as well as political conservatism in forms of endorsement of 
inequality, but not with resistance to change.  Table 3 depicts correlations between 
variables. 
Table 3. 
Correlations Between Vertical Individualism and Conservative Components 
University Sample (N = 157) 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  1 VI - 
      2 GSJ   .286** - 
     3 SDO   .344**   .191* - 
    4 ESJ   .333**   .410*  .527** - 
   5 Auth   .125   .343**  .194*   .412** - 
  6 Trad   .040   .240**  .297**   .250**   .165* - 
 7 Cons   .082   .323**  .259**   .415**   .397**   .554** - 
 
*p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
Note.  VI = Vertical Individualism, GSJ = General System Justification, ESJ = 
Economic System Justification, SDO: Social Dominance Orientation, Auth = 
Authoritarianism, Trad =Traditionalism, Cons = Conservatism 
 Multiple Regression Analyses.  I also predicted that Vertical Individualism 
would predict endorsement of inequality (Economic System Justification) and resistance 
to change (Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism) alongside the ideological 
variables of General System Justification and Social Dominance Orientation.  Results 
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indicated that Vertical Individualism was not able to predict Economic System 
Justification (Table 4), Authoritarianism (Table 5), Conservatism (Table 6), or 
Traditionalism (Table 7) alongside the ideological conservative variables of General 
System Justification and Social Dominance Orientation.  
 
Table 4. 
     
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Endorsement of 
Inequality - University Sample (N = 157) 
Variable                                      Economic System Justification 
  b SE b       β 
Constant 2.10 .29  
Vertical Individualism .07 .05       .10 
General System Justification .30 .07       .30*** 
Social Dominance Orientation .42 .07       .44*** 
R
2 
       .39    
F
 
                   31.95***    
  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
 
 
Table 5.    
     
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Resistance to Change  
Authoritarianism (N = 157) 
Variable                                Authoritarianism 
  b SE b       β 
Constant 3.41 .38  
Vertical Individualism - .01 .06  - .12 
General System Justification   .36 .09      .32*** 
Social Dominance Orientation   .15 .09      .14 
R
2 
       .16    
F
 
                     7.908***    
  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
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Table 6.         
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Resistance to Change  
Conservatism (N = 157) 
Variable                               Conservatism 
  b SE b       β 
Constant 2.48 .45  
Vertical Individualism - .08 .08    - .08 
General System Justification   .40 .10      .30*** 
Social Dominance Orientation   .29 .10      .23** 
R
2 
         .15    
F
 
                      8.973***    
  ** p < .01,  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
 
Table 7.         
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Resistance to Change  
Traditionalism (N = 157) 
Variable                              Traditionalism 
  b SE b       β 
Constant 2.25 .50  
Vertical Individualism - .13 .08     - .13 
General System Justification   .32 .16       .22** 
Social Dominance Orientation   .42 .11       .30*** 
R
2 
         .14    
F
 
                      8.037***    
  ** p < .01,  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
 
Discussion of Results 
 The premise of this study revolves around whether or not a cultural dimension 
embracing hierarchical tenets is present, can be measured, and is associated with 
conservative values.  I tested this by assessing how Vertical Individualism (VI), a cultural 
dimension emphasizing status and hierarchical social values, relate to constructs that has 
been shown to predict conservatism, such as Social Dominance Orientation, General and 
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Economic System Justification.  Within the University sample, there was a significant 
positive correlation between VI and endorsement of inequality; however, no significant 
correlation was found between VI and resistance to change.  
  Building on the assertion that a VI cultural dimension is associated to 
conservatism, I hypothesized that it also has the potential of predicting the construct in 
terms of endorsement of inequality and resistance to social change together with the 
ideological variables.  Using a multiple regression analyses, I was not able to support this 
prediction as VI did not contribute significantly to the variance of conservatism in terms 
of endorsement of inequality or resistance to change.  
  The notion that VI does not correlate with or predict resistance to change and 
endorsement of inequality may be possibly attributed to the relatively young age of the 
sample (MAge = 23.4).  People tend to become more strongly rooted in their political and 
cultural values with higher age, as well as more fiscally and socially conservative 
Altemeyer, 1996; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).  For instance, the mean age for those 
identifying with right-wing political groups (e.g., the Republican- and Tea party) tend to 
be higher than for the relatively more left-leaning ones (e.g., the Democratic and Green 
party.)  Younger people tend to be less religious and oppose military interventions while 
favoring pro-LGBT legislation and novel social government programs (Hetherington & 
Weiler).  Further, when reviewing the literature on the demographics of high-scoring 
RWA’s, Altemeyer (1996) found that they tend to be older than those scoring low, and 
proposed that this could be due to longitudinal change or cross-sectional differences.  
Along the same lines, the beliefs and values of this young cohort might still be evolving 
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and may have not yet reached a definite level that will be longitudinally internalized.  
Furthermore, the ACT-Scale might also have been problematic as it has not been a 
frequently used instrument when assessing resistance to change, whereas the Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) scale has (Jost et al., 2003; Altemeyer, 1996).  Study 2 
addressed these issues by using two general population samples from two distinct 
cultures while also replacing the ACT-Scale with a shortened RWA scale.   
Study 2 
 In the second study, I investigated whether a difference could be found between 
industrialized cultures that have, at face value, historical and political systems 
emphasizing egalitarianism (e.g., social democracy) and those that traditionally value 
hierarchical free-market tendencies.  In short, I predicted that a hierarchical cultural 
difference could be found in VI between a generally political liberal country (Sweden, 
less hierarchy) and a more conservative one (USA, more hierarchy).  
Participants 
  Participant recruitment for the second study went through Qualtrics Services, a 
research oriented organization that recruits participants for survey based studies and 
grants them with points that can be redeemed for an undisclosed monetary compensation 
or other types of internal rewards.  Participants were recruited from Sweden (N = 164, 73 
men and 91 women, Mage = 52.39) and from the United States (N = 299, 140 men and 159 
women, Mage = 59).  The only recruitment criteria was that participants had to be older 
than 21 years of age.  Ethnicity and educational characteristics can be seen in Appendix 
A.  
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Materials and Procedure 
  The same methodology and instruments from Study 1 were implemented in Study 
2, with the exception of the ACT scale which was replaced with the short-RWA scale.  
The short-RWA scale is a 15-item instrument measuring the authoritarian spectrum and is 
used to assess resistance to social and societal change (Zakrisson, 2005).  
Translation 
  All of the instruments (GSJ, SDO, and ESJ) were translated for the Swedish 
sample, except for the short-RWA scale, which was already available in Swedish 
(Zakrisson, 2005).  The translation was first made by Qualtrics Translation Services, and 
then back translated by two native Swedish-speaking individuals.  Few adjustments were 
made in the wording of the items after the instruments were translated back into English.  
A pilot study with three native Swedish-speaking participants with fluency in English, 
being asked to compare the Swedish to English instruments, was conducted in order to 
evaluate whether the items corresponded to the English versions.  Aside from few minor 
wording adjustments, the instruments reached a satisfactory level of translation. 
Results 
  Similar to what was found in Study 1, the samples in Study 2 showed significant 
positive correlations between VI and ideological and outcome variables of conservatism 
for both Sweden (N = 164, GSJ r = .197, p < .01; ESJ r = .360, p < .001; SDO r = .238, p 
< .001) and the United States (N = 299, GSJ r = .231, p < .001; ESJ r = .367, p < .001; 
SDO r = .234, p < .001; RWA r = .188, p < .001). However, the correlation to resistance 
 27 
 
 
to change was not significant for the Swedish sample.   
 
Table 8. 
Correlations Between Cultural and Conservative Components – Sweden (N=164) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1 VI - 
     2 GSJ   .197* - 
    3 SDO   .238**   .026 - 
   4 ESJ   .360**   .106   .320 - 
  5 RWA-Resistance   .027   .731**   .029   .041 - 
 6 RWA   .266**   .643**   .156*   .322**   .722** - 
 
* p < .05,  **p  < .01,  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
  Note.  VI = Vertical Individualism, GSJ = General System Justification, ESJ = Economic 
System Justification, SDO: Social Dominance Orientation, RWA-Resistance = Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism-Resistance, RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
 
   The Swedish RWA measure displayed problematic issues as it lacked a 
satisfactory level of internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .27).  Due to the RWA scale 
being flawed and unsatisfactory, I conducted a factor analysis that only used two items 
that would give adequate internal reliability (alpha = .70), resulting in a more accurate 
construct reflecting resistance to social change.  The items included were “our country 
needs free thinkers who will have the courage to stand up against traditional ways, even if 
this upsets many people” and “our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and 
understanding for untraditional values and opinions.”  Correlations between VI and 
conservative components for the Swedish and American sample can be seen in Table 8 
and Table 9 respectively. 
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  The third hypothesis proposed that the Swedish sample would score lower on VI 
and conservative components due to its more egalitarian-oriented milieu.  The prediction 
was supported by an independent sample t-test as noteworthy significant differences were 
found between the two countries (Table 10), with the United States scoring higher on 
both conservative components (GSJ, SDO, and ESJ) and for the hierarchical cultural 
dimension (VI, t’s (456 – 460) > 3.90, p’s < .001).  
 
Table 10.   
Independent Sample t-test for USA and Sweden 
 USA (N = 299) Sweden (N = 164)   
 
Scale M SD M SD t df p D 
         
    VI 4.02 1.09 3.44 1.00 5.40 460 < .0001 .53 
    GSJ 4.08 1.01 3.69 1.17 4.04 460 < .0001 .39 
    SDO 2.84 1.04 2.44 1.07 3.91 456 < .0001 .38 
    ESJ 4.67 1.05 4.11 1.55 4.59 456 < .0001 .38 
Note.  VI = Vertical Individualism, GSJ = General System Justification, ESJ = Economic 
System Justification, SDO: Social Dominance Orientation, RWA-Resistance = Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism-Resistance.  All p values are two-tailed. 
 
Table 9. 
Correlations Between Cultural and Conservative Components – USA (N = 299) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
      1 Vertical Individualism - 
    2 General System Justification    .231** - 
   3 Social Dominance Orientation    .234**    .152** - 
  4 Economic System Justification    .367**    .379**    .679** - 
 5 RWA    .188**    .273**    .315**    .411** - 
* p  < .05,  **p  < .01,  ***p < .001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
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  Multiple Regression Analyses.  Multiple regression analysis was used to test if 
VI could be of potential inclusion in the ideological components of Jost et al.’s (2003) 
model of political conservatism.  I tested whether General System Justification, Social 
Dominance Orientation, and VI could predict political conservatism through Resistance 
to Change and Endorsement of inequality, measured by a short modified version of RWA 
scale and Economic System Justification respectively.  I tested this model in both the 
American and Swedish samples to assess whether similar or different patterns emerged.  
  Results from multiple regression analyses for an American general population 
sample (N = 299) indicated that the three ideological predictors explained 56% of the 
variance for ESJ (R
2 
= .56, F(3, 290)=125.22, p < .0001).  It was found that GSJ (β = .25, 
p < .001), SDO (β = .60, p < .001), and VI (β = .17, p < .0001) all significantly 
contributed to the variance and predicted endorsement of inequality (Table 11). 
Table 11.       
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Endorsement of Inequality 
and Resistance to Change (N = 299) – American Sample 
Variable                     Endorsement of Inequality                  Resistance to Change 
  b SE b β  b SE b     β 
Constant 1.25 .21   1.24 .36  
Vertical Individualism   .16 .04 .17***    .01 .07  .01 
General System 
Justification 
  .26 .04 .25***    .11 .07  .08 
Social Dominance 
Orientation 
  .61 .04 .60***    .55 .07  .44*** 
R
2 
   .56      .22    
F
 
125.22***     26.16***   
  ***p < .0001 (all p values are two-tailed) 
 30 
 
 
  Additionally, I conducted multiple regressions for predicting resistance to change 
(RWA).  The analysis implied that although 22% of the variance was accounted for (R
2 
= .22, F(3, 285)=26.16, p < .001), only SDO was significantly predicting resistance to 
change (β = .44, p < .001). 
  Results indicated that the three predictors accounted for 57% of the variance for 
the  RWA-Resistance scale (R
2 
= .57, F(3, 143)=61.49, p < .0001) with only GSJ (β = .-
.78, p < .0001) and VI (β = .14, p < .05) being significant contributors.  Results for the 
Endorsement of Inequality for the Swedish sample accounted for 49% of the variance (R
2 
= .49, F(3, 143)=44.84, p < .0001).  However, the only variables that significantly 
contributed to the variance were VI (β = .22, p < .001) and SDO (β = .59, p < .0001). 
Results for the Swedish sample are depicted in Table 12.   
 
Table 12.            
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Endorsement of Inequality 
and Resistance to Change – Sweden (N = 164) 
Variable            Endorsement of Inequality           Resistance to Change 
  B SE B Beta  B SE B Beta 
Constant  .99 .46   7.26 .41  
Vertical Individualism .31 .09     .22**    .19 .08     .14* 
General System Justification .01 .10 .01    -1.15 .09 -.78*** 
Social Dominance Orientation .84 .09   .59***     .02 .08   .12 
R
2 
      .49        .57   
F
 
    44.84***   61.49***   
  ***p < .0001, **p < .001,  *p < .05 (all p values are two-tailed) 
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Discussion of Results 
  The second study was built on the presumption that Vertical Individualism is 
systematically associated to the ideological components and outcome variables of 
conservatism.  This was tested in the first study and reaffirmed in the second study as 
significant positive correlations were found between Vertical Individualism (VI) and 
General (GSJ) and Economic System Justification (ESJ), Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO), and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) for both the Swedish and American 
sample.  The only exception was that after revising the RWA scale for the Swedish 
sample due to inadequate internal reliability, a new two-item scale was derived (RWA-
Resistance) which did not correlate significantly with Vertical Individualism.   
  Presuming that Vertical Individualism was associated to conservatism, I tested 
whether this relationship held true cross-culturally and if the magnitude of conservative 
components were less for an egalitarian oriented individualistic culture.  Using 
independent t-tests, I found that the Swedish sample scored significantly lower on all 
variables when compared to the American one (Table 10).  These findings support my 
third hypothesis that an egalitarian society, with social-democratic principles dominating 
the political arena, tends to be culturally and ideologically less conservative than one 
where hierarchical standards are more embraced. 
  In order to determine the construct validity of Vertical Individualism as it relates 
to conservatism, the relationship had to meet two assumptions when cross-culturally 
examined.  The first one is that if culture is indeed influencing conservatism, or vice 
versa, then the magnitude of the cultural dimension as well as conservative components 
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should differ accordingly to respective society.  This was the case for this study as the 
Swedish sample scored less on Vertical Individualism as well as all other conservative 
components.  Second, if the cultural dimension indeed is suitable for Jost et al.’s (2003) 
model of social-cognitive motives of conservatism, then Vertical Individualism should be 
significantly associated to conservatism regardless of culture.  This was true for all 
samples, aside from resistance to change for the University sample in Study 1.  These 
comparisons provide support for the notion that Vertical Individualism has the potential 
of being a suitable addition to the social-cognitive ideological motives for conservatism 
as it holds its validity cross-culturally.  Nevertheless, this alone is not enough to make a 
conclusive claim that Vertical Individualism should be included in the model.  More 
research, preferably comparing more than only two cultures and how they relate to other 
conservative components, is needed until one can make such a final assertion.  Moreover, 
in order for Vertical Individualism to be included in the ideological components, it also 
needs to be able to predict the outcome variables of conservatism, which was tested in the 
fourth hypothesis.  
  Aside from being associated to conservatism, I predicted that Vertical 
Individualism also has the potential of predicting the outcome variables of conservatism 
in terms of endorsement of inequality (ESJ scale), and resistance to social change (RWA 
scale).  Multiple regression analysis on a general population sample from both Sweden 
and the United States were used to test this.  Results indicated that Vertical Individualism 
had indeed predictive power with respect to significantly forecasting endorsement of 
inequality for both these samples.  Although the cultural dimension could predict weakly 
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resistance to change for the Swedish sample, it failed to do so for the American sample.  
What is also noteworthy is that Vertical Individualism (VI), General System Justification 
(GSJ), and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) were able to predict endorsement of 
inequality, Economic System Justification (ESJ), significantly with the exception of GSJ 
for the Swedish sample; yet these failed to do so consistently predict resistance to change.  
Only SDO significantly accounted for the variance in the American sample but not for 
the Swedish as GSJ and VI were the only significant ones.  These results suggest that 
Vertical Individualism, alongside GSJ and SDO, can predict endorsement of inequality 
but not resistance to change.  The results also indicate that Vertical Individualism is a 
suitable addition to Jost et al.’s (2003) model of ideological motives of conservatism with 
respect to endorsement of inequality, but not for resistance to change. 
General Discussion 
Current and Future Research 
  The findings of this study do not definitively support a direct causal relationship 
between culture and conservatism.  They do, however, support the notion that political 
ideology and culture are related and bound to reflect one another.  The findings also 
heighten the construct validity of Vertical Individualism and how it is influenced by the 
general priorities set through policy by a respective society.  Therefore, the question 
remains whether culture shapes policies with respect to the acceptance of inequality, or 
whether policies influence cultural values.  It is important to answer this question in order 
to determine the possibility of making a culture less hierarchical by means of legislation.  
Although the topic is much too broad to be covered in the current study, it is worth 
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discussing within the frameworks of Jost et al.’s (2003) model and the potential role 
cultural variables can play in predicting conservative ideology. 
 Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism proposes that feelings of fear and threat 
lead people to develop social-cognitive motives that, through their acceptance of 
inequality and resistance to change, result in conservatism.  These motives lead people to 
believe what they believe in order to satisfy certain psychological functions, such as 
minimizing the ambiguity in their world view or helping to ward off concerns and 
anxieties about disorder.  Most scholars generally agree that the level of conservatism in a 
population remains, more or less, the same across time.  What does change, however, 
depending on circumstances, is its effect (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).  This effect is a 
function of the perceived threat, which in turn results in measurable consequences for 
preferences, behaviors, and opinions (e.g., Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005).   
  Within the framework of authoritarianism, which is closely linked to 
conservatism, studies have overwhelmingly shown that legislation and policy-making 
tend to change in a conservative direction during times of turmoil and instability, and that 
more people embrace these types of changes as the perception of threat increases (Page, 
Shapiro, & Dempsey 1987; Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002, Hetherington & Weiler, 
2009).  Group membership in far right-wing political groups also tends to increase during 
threatening times.  For instance, far-right political parties, such as the National Front in 
France and the Tea Party in the U.S., tend to attract more members and votes during 
tumultuous times than during peaceful and quiet ones (Mudde 2007; Hetherington & 
Weiler).  Of particular interest in these types of circumstances is the way the expressed 
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effect of fear increases collective right-wing affiliation.  Future research should examine 
how support for these types of social movements during threatening times and 
circumstances affects culture by increasing right-wing affiliation  and widening the 
embrace of hierarchical values, as shown by endorsements of inequality and segregation 
of social groups. 
   Psychological threat can manifest in many ways, including the violation of social 
norms by group movements or challenging the status quo by military conflicts and 
interventions, but perhaps the more prominent and current threat for industrialized 
societies is economic destabilization.  In fact, studies have shown that during times of 
economic hardship, people embrace conservative values and figures more than during 
times of economic prosperity (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).  Economic hardship 
naturally also includes a cluster of other types of threats, such as poverty, crime, and the 
fear of imminent societal collapse.  Scholars have shown that, on an aggregated level, 
economic threat leads to support for harsher prison sentences and increased police 
budgets (Sales, 1973), enhanced public support for media censorship, and a broader 
expression of ethnocentrism and racial prejudice (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991).  The 
effect of these types of threats seems to be more severe for those scoring high on 
authoritarianism and conservatism, who, because they tend to be more reactive and to 
perceive threats in their environment to be more imminent, are more likely to adhere to 
radical “solutions” (Hetherington & Weiler). 
  These effects of the perception of social and economic threat provide a 
theoretically fitting explanation for why the samples in this study differed.  Societies 
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where overall wealth is distributed in a more egalitarian manner, such as social-
democratic ones represented by Sweden in this study, show lower public support for 
conservative values because economic threat is perceived to be less imminent.  For 
instance, the socioeconomic safety-nets, reduction of wealth gaps, and low poverty in the 
Scandinavian societies might have dramatically reduced the fear of economic collapse or 
hardship.  Sweden and its neighboring countries, which are amongst the most secular 
societies that are more inclined to assist the poor and encourage social government 
programs (e.g., free healthcare and education,) tend to be in many aspects less socially 
and politically conservative.  These societies tend to show, at face value, a culture 
denouncing class-based society and social hierarchy.  In this study, for instance, the 
Swedish sample scored significantly lower on group based dominance (SDO) and 
Vertical Individualism, indicating that tolerance there for a class-based, hierarchical, 
society is less than in the US sample.  According to the Jost et al.’s (2003) model, this is 
due to a reduced perception of threat and a lower fear of potential turmoil.   
  Additionally, in comparison to the Swedish sample, the American sample scored 
significantly higher on General and Economic System Justification, meaning they 
perceived the current system and status quo to be more righteous despite its wealth and 
social inequalities.  It might be noteworthy that currently in the United States, income 
inequality has reached its highest point since the 1940s, when national data collection for 
economic growth and income began (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).  It is also 
noteworthy that much research has linked SDO, GSJ, and ESJ directly to conservative 
ideologies and right-wing affiliations (Jost et al., 2003; Pratto et al., 1994).  Scholars have 
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explained this link as being partly due to “justifying” the current system so as to reduce 
cognitive ambiguity and anxiety and to give a simpler explanation for the status quo (see 
sections on SDO and System Justification.)  This is an important point for future research 
to explore because it provides insight into how individuals can rationalize inequality, and 
what might lead them to accept group segregation during times of economic hardship. 
  Part of the reason egalitarian societies, such as the Scandinavian ones, are less 
vertical and conservative might be their longtime avoidance of armed national military 
conflicts and other violent quarrels.  These types of conflicts tend to instill an effective 
and prolonged fear in a population (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), for it is not only the 
armed conflict per se that contributes to existential threats but its byproducts as well, thus 
leading to conservative social-cognitive motivations for conservatism.  For instance, the 
constant reminders that one has a mortal enemy and one’s inclination to rationalize the 
situation (epistemic motives,) images of casualties of fellow group-members (existential 
motives,) and the threat to one’s traditional societal status quo (ideological motives) 
contribute holistically to the inclination to embrace conservative and authoritarian values.  
Within the framework of Jost et al.’s (2003) model, because economic and mortal threats 
are lower in Sweden than in the US, the Swedes have developed reduced social-cognitive 
epistemic and existential cognitive motivations when developing conservative values.  
The reduction of these threats might also have led to the subscription to more tolerant 
political ideologies and world views, and hence explain why they scored lower on a 
hierarchical cultural dimension.  Even though these potential theories might neatly align 
with theories of conservatism, future research should examine them empirically and be 
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attentive to how the avoidance of armed conflict affects culture with respect to receptivity 
to authoritarian values. 
  It is then perhaps fair to make the assertion that policy-making, by controlling for 
socioeconomic threat, has some effect on conservatism within a culture.  Nevertheless, 
social legislation cannot control existential intimidation and fear, stemming, for instance, 
from terrorist attacks or military aggression, which has an imminent effect on levels of 
authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).  Hence, in the spirit of a traditional 
nature vs. nurture debate, future research should focus on the interaction between 
domestic legislation and external threat as it pertains to cultural conservatism.  Perhaps 
this could result in a better understanding of why military conflicts increase religious 
practices, support for autocratic figures, and increases in ethnocentrism (Hetherington & 
Weiler).  In order to investigate how these factors influence cultural values, future 
research should also focus on developing improved instruments for cultural assessments 
while being more attentive to cultural tolerance for untraditional values, group-based 
dominance, and hierarchical tenets.  This would help improve the methodological aspects 
of studying and understanding the dynamic between collective and subjective ideology 
and situationism. 
Implications 
  Conservatism is not a unidimensional psychological construct, but a cognitive 
thought pattern greatly shaped by fear and threat to one’s individual and collective 
wellbeing.  The level of manifested effect is a function of the perceived imminent threat 
in one’s current milieu, resulting in psychological fear and leading to the development of 
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social-cognitive motivations that are expressed in a number of ways.  Many times the 
outcome is dramatic support for legislative action, active participations in civic right-
wing movements (a la the Tea-Party,) and increased support for hostile domestic and 
foreign policy, such as war or the death penalty (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).  No 
matter the outcome, the perception of collective fear and threat changes societal values 
and hence culture.  This is precisely why conservatism, authoritarianism, and right-wing 
ideologies are so crucial to understand; when perception of threat reaches high existential 
levels, it runs the risk of being manifested in extreme forms, such as religious 
fundamentalism, support for autocratic figures (e.g., idolism,) or systematic racism.  For 
instance, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, support for right-wing legislation 
surged resulting in increased public support for military action and defense spending, 
President Bush’s approval rating reached its highest point, and anti-Muslim racism 
became more prevalent (Hetherington & Weiler).   
 On an aggregated level, these types of changes in beliefs and attitude reflect how 
fear and threat lead to alterations in societal values.  Hence,  assessing cultural 
dimensions after drastic changes in public opinions like these can help us interpret the 
dynamic between circumstances and right-wing ideology. This approach also has the 
potential for providing a better understanding of why radical ideologies take root and 
drastically influence cultures to become less tolerant (e.g., theocratic societies, extremist 
organizations, and far-right fascist movements.)  Not only is conservatism associated 
with low socioeconomic status, but developing societies that have indulged in intense 
armed conflict seem to become more autocratic as well (Altemeyer, 1996: Hetherington 
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& Weiler, 2009).  Even though previous studies have made the assumptions that war and 
poverty lead to increased conservative values on an individual level, most have bypassed 
the notion that these types of threats result in social values that amplify the group support 
for right-wing, radical, ideologies (e.g., Jost et al. 2003).  That is, the threats result in 
creating a cultural milieu for fostering the acceptance for social and economic inequality 
and resistance to change.  Culture serves as a reflection of these attitudes, can potentially 
act as a mediator for group thinking, and quantifying and assessing it can give insight into 
how occurrences influence conservatism on a collective scale, such as the shift in cultural 
values after the September 11
th
 terrorist acts.   
  These are a few of the reasons why culture and conservatism influence one 
another and why considering including circumstantial variables is of value to optimize 
Jost et al.’s (2003) model of conservatism.  Taking cultural values into account can also 
lead to two valuable types of directions in research that leads to a better understanding of 
how environment and ideology affect each other.  First, assessing cultural dimensions and 
conservatism allows us to see how societies shift to be more or less tolerant after fear 
inducing incidents, including terrorism, fascistic legislation, or military conflict.  Second, 
it allows us to compare and contrast different cultures.  This is particularly valuable as it 
not only allows us to see how different societies react to similar threats, but also how 
their respective social values might change (one potential approach might be to cross-
examine Jost et al.’s (2003) model between diverse societies and using cultural values 
acting as mediators.)  Although it might not be reasonable to draw conclusions by 
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comparing cultures at face value due to their complexity, this methodology has potential 
to provide insight into how certain political systems affect cultural values. 
Limitations 
  There are a few caveats to this study that should be taken into account when 
considering the results.  The first are the small sample sizes used for the University 
sample (N = 157), general population samples from the US (N = 299) and Sweden (N = 
164), which may be underpowered and not reveal true representative results of the 
population.  These small sample sizes, together with the fact that Qualtrics services 
recruited the participants from their panel with undisclosed locations,  might also have 
led to a skewed distribution of cultural values.  For instance, there is a chance that more 
people may have been recruited from a traditionally conservative area (e.g. the American 
south,) than a generally more liberal one (e.g., American northwest,) or vice versa 
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).  Future research should focus on larger sample sizes and 
be aware of the sub-cultures of right-wing ideologies pertaining to various geographical 
regions that can potentially create inaccurate representations of populations. 
 Another important limitation, and perhaps the most noteworthy one, was the 
Swedish short-RWA scale, which reflects reluctance to social change.  Although the scale 
claimed to have a Cronbach’s alpha of around .72 to .80 across the three samples 
(Zakrisson, 2005), reaching satisfactory levels of reliability was problematic.  The scale 
for the Swedish sample only provided an alpha of .27, which was far below the 
acceptance level. Even after conducting multiple factor analyses, the short-RWA still 
failed to reach acceptable levels of reliability.  In order to use the data obtained from the 
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scale to predict resistance to change using multiple regressions, only two items were used 
which provided a reliability of .70 for Cronbach’s alpha.  This may have confounded the 
data and the outcomes for resistance to change in the Swedish sample.  Future researchers 
should focus on using a scale assessing resistance to change with a good track record for 
internal reliability across diverse cultures and languages.  
  The risk of cultural differences in the interpretation of semantics, constructs, and 
concepts is also a potential limitation.  Although all instruments, aside from the short-
RWA, were translated back and forth multiple times, their conceptual interpretation of 
certain terminologies remains a concern.  For example, the perception and interpretation 
of poverty might be different in an American society than in a Swedish one.  Even though 
all scales, aside from the short-RWA, had high reliabilities, this issue is still an important 
factor to consider when interpreting the results and something to keep in mind for future 
directions.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Ethnicity and Education Characteristics for all Samples 
 
 
                             Sample 
 
 
 
 
University 
 
U.S 
 
Sweden 
 
Ethnicity    
 Caucasian 31 252  
 African American 8 14  
 Hispanic 38 5  
 Asian 52 5  
 Native American 1 2  
 Pacific Islander 9   
 Other/Mixed 17 10  
 Total 157 299  
Education    
 Less than High School  5 15 
 High School/GED 51 63 79 
 Some College 79 71 n/a 
 2-year College 21 43 n/a 
 4-year College 4 68 24 
 MA/MS 2 28 14 
 PhD or MD  6 1 
 Other Professional Degree  4 31 
 Total 157 299 164 
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APPENDIX B 
Short Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale 
 
Rated on a 7 point Likert Scale. Items in italics are reversely scored. 
 
1. Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral 
currents prevailing in society today. 
2. Our country needs free thinkers, who will have the courage to stand up against 
traditional ways, even if this upsets many people. 
3. The ‘‘old-fashioned ways’’ and ‘‘old-fashioned values’’ still show the best way to live. 
4. Our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and understanding for 
untraditional values and opinions. 
5. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before 
it is too late, violations must be punished. 
6. The society needs to show openness towards people thinking differently, rather than a 
strong leader, the world is not particularly evil or dangerous. 
7. It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get 
hold of destructive and disgusting material. 
8. Many good people challenge the state, criticize the church and ignore ‘‘the normal 
way of living’’. 
9. Our forefathers ought to be honored more for the way they have built our society, at 
the same time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it. 
10. People ought to put less attention to the Bible and religion, instead they ought to 
develop their own moral standards. 
11. There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; the society ought to 
stop them. 
12. It is better to accept bad literature than to censor it. 
13. Facts show that we have to be harder against crime and sexual immorality, in order to 
uphold law and order. 
14. The situation in the society of today would be improved if troublemakers were treated 
with reason and humanity. 
15. If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil 
that poisons our country from within. 
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APPENDIX C 
Authoritarian-Conservatism-Traditionalism (ACT) Scale 
 
Rated on a 9 point Likert rating scale (see below) 
 
-4: Very strongly disagree 
-3: Strongly disagree 
-2: Somewhat disagree 
-1: Slightly disagree 
0: Unsure/Neutral 
+1: Slightly agree 
+2: Somewhat agree 
+3: Strongly agree 
+4: Very strongly agree 
 
Authoritarianism (“Authoritarian aggression”) 
 
1. *Strong, tough government will harm not help our country. (R)  
2. *Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your 
weakness, so it's best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them.  
3. *Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws. (R)  
4. *The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down 
harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.  
5. *Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve 
much better care, instead of so much punishment. (R)  
6. *The way things are going in this country, it's going to take a lot of "strong medicine" 
to straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts.  
7. We should smash all the negative elements that are causing trouble in our society.  
8. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be 
justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.  
9. People who say our laws should be enforced more strictly and harshly are wrong. We 
need greater tolerance and more lenient treatment for lawbreakers. (R)  
10. The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any 
good in cases like these. (R)  
11. What our country really needs is a tough, harsh dose of law and order.  
12. Capital punishment is barbaric and never justified. (R)  
Conservatism (“Authoritarian submission”) 
 
1. *It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority. (R)  
2. *What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in 
unity.  
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3. *Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, 
and confront established authorities. (R)  
4. *Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn.  
5. *Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders.  
6. *People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws they don’t agree with. 
(R)  
7. People should be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the overthrow of 
the government. (R)  
8. The more people there are that are prepared to criticize the authorities, challenge and 
protest against the government, the better it is for society. (R)  
9. People should stop teaching children to obey authority. (R)  
10. The real keys to the "good life" are respect for authority and obedience to those who 
are in charge.  
11. The authorities should be obeyed because they are in the best position to know what 
is good for our country.  
12. Our leaders should be obeyed without questions.  
Traditionalism 
 
1. *Nobody should stick to the "straight and narrow". Instead people should break loose 
and try out lots of different ideas and experiences. (R)  
2. *The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.  
3. *God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late.  
4. *There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (R)  
5. *This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, 
and sex, and pay more attention to family values.  
6. *There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (R) 
7. Traditional values, customs, and morality have a lot wrong with them. (R)  
8. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, 
even if it makes them different from everyone else. (R)  
9. The radical and sinful new ways of living and behaving of many young people may 
one day destroy our society.  
10. Trashy magazines and radical literature in our communities are poisoning the minds 
of our young people. 11. It is important that we preserve our traditional values and moral 
standards.  
12. People should pay less attention to the bible and the other old-fashioned forms of 
religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and 
immoral. (R)  
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APPENDIX D 
Economic System Justification Scale 
 
Indicate level of agreement or disagreement on a scale ranging from 1 to 9. 
(R): reversely scored 
 
-4: Very strongly disagree 
-3: Strongly disagree 
-2: Somewhat disagree 
-1: Slightly disagree 
0: Unsure/Neutral 
+1: Slightly agree 
+2: Somewhat agree 
+3: Strongly agree 
+4: Very strongly agree 
 
 
1. If people work hard, they almost always get what they want. 
2. The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean that they are 
inevitable (R).  
3. Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society. 
4. There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair (R). 
5. It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty. 
6. Poor people are not essentially different from rich people (R). 
7. Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame the system; they 
have only themselves to blame. 
8. Equal distribution of resources is a possibility for our society (R). 
9. Social class differences reflect differences in natural order of things. 
10. Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate distribution of 
resources (R). 
11. There will always be poor people, because there will never be enough jobs for 
everybody. 
12. Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements. 
13. If people wanted to change the economic system to make things equal, they could 
(R). 
14. Equal distribution of resources is unnatural. 
15. It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme wealth and 
extreme poverty at the same time (R). 
16. There is no point in trying to make income more equal. 
17. There are no inherent differences between rich and poor; it is purely a matter of 
circumstance into which you are born (R). 
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APPENDIX E 
Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism 
 
Scored on a 7 point Likert scale: 
 
1: Strongly disagree 
2: Moderately disagree 
3: Slightly disagree 
4: Neither disagree nor agree 
5: Slightly agree 
6: Moderately agree 
7: Strongly agree 
 
 
Horizontal Individualism 
1. I’d rather depend on myself than others. 
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. 
3. I often do “my own thing.” 
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me. 
 
Vertical Individualism 
1. It is important that I do my job better than others. 
2. Winning is everything. 
3. Competition is the law of nature. 
4. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused. 
 
Horizontal Collectivism 
1. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud. 
2. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me. 
3. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. 
4. I feel good when I cooperate with others. 
 
Vertical Collectivism 
1. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible. 
2. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want. 
3. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required. 
4. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. 
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APPENDIX F 
General System Justification Scale 
 
7 point Likert type response scale:  
 
1: Strongly disagree 
2: Moderately disagree 
3: Slightly disagree 
4: Neither disagree nor agree 
5: Slightly agree 
6: Moderately agree 
7: Strongly agree 
 
Items: 
 
1. In general, you find society is fair. 
2. In general, the American political system does operate as intended. 
3. American society is structured adequately. 
4. The United States is the best country in the world to live in. 
5. Most policies do serve the greater good. 
6. Everyone does have a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
7. Our society does get worse every year. 
8. Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
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APPENDIX G 
Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
 
Scored on a Likert scale from 1 to 7 
 
7: Extremely positive 
6: Somewhat positive 
5: Slightly positive 
4: Neutral 
3: Slightly negative 
2: Somewhat negative 
1: Extremely negative 
 
 
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling 
towards?  
 
1. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.*  
2. Group equality should be our ideal.*  
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.  
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.  
5. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.*  
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and others are at the bottom.  
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.  
8. We would have fewer problems if groups were treated more equally.*  
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.*  
10. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.  
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.*  
12. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.  
13. We should strive for increased social equality.*  
14. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.  
15. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
16. No one group should dominate in society.* 
 
* reversely scored 
 
 
 
 
